This book investigates
Romania’s early 1960s change in policy towards the Soviet Union, focusing on
two questions in particular: namely, what actually changed and why this change
occurred. Drawing from recently declassified archive materials, this book
utilises a perceptual approach and a paradigm which argues that post-war
Romania allied not against the threat, but with the (perceived) threat – the
USSR. Focusing on the proximate causes triggering this policy change, it investigates
the emergence of Romania’s opposition to the USSR predominantly through two
case studies – the CMEA reform process and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The book
focuses on the period between 1960 and 1964, between Romania’s first
categorical (albeit non-public and indirect) opposition to the USSR and the
issuing of the declaration marking Romania’s first public and official
(although indirect) acknowledgement of disagreements with the USSR.
This book examines the proximate causes of Romania’s policy
change towards the Soviet Union and their roots in Romanian leaders’
perceptions of the threats posed to the nation’s interests by various specific
Soviet policies, such as the attempts to impose the CMEA integration or a
strong collective riposte against China. Through its findings, the book
provides new research perspectives on Romanian-Soviet post-war relations and on
the role of the leaders’ beliefs in Romania’s foreign policy choices. It will
also serve as a starting point for a more detailed understanding of the unusual
present-day relations between Romania and the Russian Federation.
More details about this book on Cambridge Scholars Publishing website.
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